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Stephen Schiffer introduced the “meaning-intention problem” as an ar-
gument against certain semantic analyses that invoke hidden indexical 
expressions. According to the argument, such analyses are incompatible 
with a Gricean view of speaker’s meaning, for they require speakers to 
refer to things about which they are ignorant, such as modes of pre-
sentation. Stephen Neale argues that a complementary problem arises 
due to the fact that speakers may also be ignorant of the very existence 
of such aphonic expressions. In this paper, I attempt to articulate the 
assumptions that support the meaning-intention problem. I argue that 
these assumptions are incompatible with some basic linguistic data. For 
instance, a speaker could have used a sentence like “The book weighs 
fi ve pounds” to mean that the book weighs fi ve pounds on Earth, even 
before anyone knew that weight was a relativized property. The existence 
of such “extrinsic parameters” undermines the force of the meaning-in-
tention problem. However, since the meaning-intention problem arises 
naturally from a Gricean view of speaker’s meaning and speaker’s refer-
ence, the failure of the argument raises problems for the Gricean. I argue 
that the analysis of referring-with offered by Schiffer, and defended by 
Neale, is defective.
Keywords: Grice, speaker meaning, reference, hidden indexical, 
meaning-intention problem.
1. What Is the Meaning-Intention Problem?
1.1. The Meaning-Intention Problem: Background
When confronted with some recalcitrant data, it is common practice 
in linguistic theorizing to invoke hidden representational structure. 
Hidden structures abound in syntactic theory, but they are common in 
semantics as well. If one is unable to generate the intuitively correct 
truth conditions for a sentence simply by assigning semantic values 
to the overt parts, one can often resolve this problem by appealing to 
covert variables or modifi ers.
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For example, it is notoriously hard to account for truth value judg-
ments regarding belief attributions without invoking such hidden 
structure:
(1) Alice believes that George Eliot is a man.
(2) Alice believes that Mary Ann Evans is a man.
Let us suppose that Alice has heard the names ‘George Eliot’ and ‘Mary 
Ann Evans’ before, and she thinks they denote two distinct English au-
thors. Then it is plausible to suppose that (1) and (2) might receive dif-
ferent truth values. But a naïve, extensional analysis of proper names 
would make it diffi cult to account for this difference. This is in part the 
motivation for Fregean theories of proper names.
On a Fregean analysis, expressions appearing in intensional con-
texts do not denote their reference, but instead denote their (custom-
ary) sense. Since ‘George Eliot’ and ‘Mary Ann Evans’ differ in sense, 
their occurrences in (1) and (2) differ in reference, and hence (1) and (2) 
may differ in truth value. Thus, although a classical Fregean analysis 
does not require positing any hidden structure in a belief report, it does 
imply that the proposition meant contains senses, entities of which 
speakers may lack a concept.
A competing account can be found in the writings of neo-Russellian 
theorists such as Nathan Salmon (1986). These theorists differ from 
the Fregeans in holding that the semantic value of a proper name is 
exhausted by its referent, however they explain the apparent failure 
of substitutivity by positing substantial hidden complexity in belief at-
tributions. In particular, whereas a naïve view might hold that believes 
expresses a two-place relation between a believer and a proposition 
believed, Salmon proposes that belief attributions in fact express a 
three-place relation between a believer, a proposition believed, and a 
propositional guise under which the believer accepts the proposition:
(3) For some guise x, Alice grasps that George Eliot is a man by 
  means of x and BEL(Alice, that George Eliot is a man, x).
According to this view, the semantic analysis of both (1) and (2) is (3). 
Thus, both sentences are literally true. However, (2) is highly mislead-
ing, and pragmatically conveys something false (e.g, that Alice would 
assent to ‘Mary Ann Evans is a man’). Thus, we are simply judging the 
sentence according to what is pragmatically conveyed, rather than its 
semantic content. This view also allows us to account for sentences like,
(4) Alice believes that Mary Ann Evans is not a man,
as follows:
(5) For some x, Alice grasps that George Eliot is not a man by means 
  of x and BEL(Alice, that George Eliot is not a man, x).
Alice may accept (BEL) that George Eliot/Mary Ann Evans is a man 
under some guises, and reject it (or accept its negation) under other 
guises. This elegant analysis allows one to preserve a simplifi ed, Mil-
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lian view of proper names, while accommodating the cases of substitu-
tion failure in a fairly systematic way.
However, the neo-Russellian analysis of belief attribution also re-
quires the theorist to posit entities—guises—of which the speaker is 
ignorant, in the semantic analysis of ordinary belief reports. In addi-
tion, it implies that the logical structure of a belief attribution is more 
complex than an ordinary speaker might recognize. These facts are the 
basis of a persuasive argument against such theories, fi rst developed 
by Stephen Schiffer (1992). This argument, known as the meaning-in-
tention problem, claims that such analyses cannot be correct, because 
speakers do not, and cannot, mean what such analyses require them 
to mean.
Schiffer develops his argument in response to the hidden-indexical 
theory of belief attributions. This view, similar to Salmon’s, analyzes 
belief reports as follows:
(6) Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.
(7) (For some m) (∏*m & B(Ralph, <Fido, doghood>, m))
On this view, (6) is analyzed as the statement that Ralph believes that 
Fido is a dog under some mode of presentation (MOP) m, where m sat-
isfi es some contextually specifi ed constraint on MOPs ∏*.
“The meaning-intention problem” in fact covers a number of related 
concerns raised by Schiffer for this type of analysis:
(a) The Awareness Problem—If the hidden-indexical theory of be-
lief reports is true, then speakers lack full, conscious aware-
ness of what they mean, for most speakers have no idea that 
they are referring to a MOP-property: “Thus, if the hidden-
indexical theory is correct, then [the speaker] has no conscious 
awareness of what she means, or of what she is saying… and 
this is a prima facie reason to deny that she means what the 
theory is committed to saying she means” (Schiffer 1992: 514).
(b) The Cognitive-Resources Problem—If the hidden-indexical 
theory is true, then what a speaker means may involve enti-
ties about which the speaker is totally ignorant (such as MOP-
properties).
(c) The Specifi city Problem—If the hidden indexical theory is true, 
then there must be some particular property ∏* of MOPs that 
the speaker is referring to. But it’s doubtful that the speaker’s 
intentions serve to pick out any such particular property (the 
speaker lacks “specifying intentions,” we may say). 
On the assumption that speakers do, generally, have full, conscious 
awareness of their own speech and thought contents, and that speaker-
meaning requires a speaker to have a conceptual grasp of the particular 
entities and properties that comprise the contents of their speech acts, 
the meaning-intention problem raises serious doubts about the hidden-
indexical theory of belief reports. Similar doubts would arise for any 
theory that posits, in the semantic analysis of some sentence, entities, 
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properties, or structure about which the speaker (a) lacks conscious 
awareness, (b) is totally ignorant, or (c) lacks specifying intentions.
Schiffer (1996) deploys this argument against another prominent 
contextualist theory that invokes hidden indexicals: contextualist 
theories of knowledge claims. Such theories are in part an attempt 
to respond to the fact that a sentence like ‘I know that I have hands’ 
might be judged true in an ordinary context, but false in the context of 
a discussion about Descartes’s evil demon. Contextualists claim that 
knowledge claims are tacitly relativized to a standard of knowledge, 
which affects the kind of evidence needed to support a knowledge claim 
in a given context. Thus, ‘I know that I have hands relative to a low 
standard of knowledge’ might be true, while ‘I know that I have hands 
relative to a high standard of knowledge’ might be false.
Schiffer sees two problems with this approach. First, it again im-
plies that speakers are not fully aware of what they mean, think, 
or say: “But no ordinary person who utters ‘I know that p’, however 
articulate, would dream of telling you that what he meant and was 
implicitly stating was that he knew that p relative to such-and-such 
standard” (Schiffer 1996: 326–327). Second, it implies that speakers’ 
conception of their own speech contents may not only be incomplete, 
but may be seriously mistaken. For the contextualist hopes to explain 
why the following kind of argument appears to be sound, even though 
the conclusion seems incorrect:
(A)  I don’t know that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat.
(B)  I know that I have hands only if I know that I’m not a brain 
   in a vat.
(C)  Therefore, I don’t know that I have hands.
The response is that (C) strikes us as false because we are prone to 
interpret it as:
(C*) Therefore, I don’t know that I have hands relative to a low 
   standard of knowledge,
even when the context dictates that we ought to interpret it as:
(C**) Therefore, I don’t know that I have hands relative to a high 
   standard of knowledge.
The problem, according to Schiffer, is that it’s highly implausible to 
suppose that speakers could be so confused about the content of their 
own speech acts: “It’s as though a fl uent, sane, and alert speaker, who 
knows where she is, were actually to assert the proposition that it’s 
raining in London, when she mistakenly thinks she’s asserting the 
proposition that it’s raining in Oxford” (Schiffer 1996: 326).
1.2. Assumptions Behind the Meaning-Intention Problem
As we have seen, the meaning-intention problem attempts to cast 
doubt on contextualist semantic theories by arguing that we can’t take 
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speakers to mean what such theories require them to mean. However, 
the argument is deployed with different emphasis in different places. 
Thus, it is worthwhile to clearly articulate the assumptions upon which 
such an argument rests:
(Awareness) If a speaker, S, performs an utterance, and means there-
by that p, and x is a constituent of the proposition p, then S must be 
consciously aware that x is part of what she means.
(Cognitive Resources) If a speaker, S, performs an utterance, and 
means thereby that p, and x is a constituent of the proposition p, then 
S must have a concept of x, whether consciously accessible or not.
(Specifi city) If a speaker, S, performs an utterance, and means there-
by that p, and x is a constituent of the proposition p, then S must have 
specifying intentions that uniquely determine reference to x, rather 
than any other nearby candidates that might appear to serve just as 
well in the context.
Here, I adopt a structured-proposition view of propositional content 
for ease of exposition. Saying that x is a constituent of the proposition 
p is simply an attempt to capture the intuitive idea that p is, in some 
sense, “about” x. If a speaker utters ‘It’s raining’ and means thereby 
that it’s raining in London, then she has said something about London. 
The truth conditions of her utterance are sensitive to how things are 
in London.
Although these principles are distinct, they all attempt to use the 
fact that meaning is an intentional act performed by speakers as a way 
to constrain what counts as an acceptable semantic analysis. In Section 
II, I argue that these principles are not sound, and that the meaning-
intention problem, as stated, is far too powerful.
1.3. The Aphonic-Intention Problem
Stephen Neale (2016) defends Schiffer’s meaning-intention problem, 
and claims there is an additional problem related to the use of aphonic 
referring expressions. The problem is based on the Gricean analysis of 
what is it to refer with an expression:
(RW) In uttering x, S referred to o with (or using) e, relative to its i-th 
occurrence in x, iff for some audience A and relation R, S intended A to 
recognize that R(e, x, i, o) and, at least partly on the basis of this, that 
S referred to o in uttering x.
R, in this defi nition, is, effectively, the inference-base feature (cf. 
Schiffer 2017) of the expression e, that is, the property that S believes e 
has (relative to its position i in the sentence x), such that the audience 
will recognize that S is referring to o partly on the basis of recognizing 
this feature. Often, this feature is simply the fact that e is convention-
ally used to refer to o.
This defi nition of referring-with invokes the more basic notion of 
speaker-referring, which Neale follows Schiffer in defi ning as:
388 J. Rappaport, Is There a Meaning-Intention Problem?
(SR) In f-ing, S referred to o iff what S meant by f-ing is an o-dependent 
proposition (a singular proposition that has o as a constituent).
This defi nition, in turn, analyzes speaker-referring in terms of the 
more basic notion of speaker’s meaning, and hence, together these defi -
nitions allow us to explain what it is for a speaker to refer with an 
expression in basic Gricean terms.
What’s important, for the present discussion, about this Gricean 
analysis of referring-with is that it entails that if a speaker uses e to 
refer to o, then the speaker must have an intention that has the ex-
pression e as part of its content. It’s not simply that, in referring to o, 
a speaker must employ the expression e in actualizing her intention, 
the way she must perform an alveolar stop in pronouncing the word to, 
something which most English speakers are capable of, whether or not 
they have a concept of alveolar stop. For in general, it isn’t the case that 
if actualizing some intention requires a subject to utilize some capacity, 
then she must be aware of possessing that capacity. However, due to 
the nature of communicative intentions, if a speaker uses some expres-
sion e to refer to o, then she must intend for the audience to recognize 
that e has some inference-base feature, and thus, she must be capable 
of forming intentions whose content involves the expression e. This im-
plies that referring with some expression e requires the subject to have 
some level of conceptual grasp of the expression e itself.
The problem that Neale raises is that this consequence is extremely 
dubious for cases of aphonic referring expressions, since most speakers 
have no idea that such expressions exist. Thus, there is a meaning-
intention problem not only with respect to the entities that a speaker 
refers to, but also with respect to the entities that speakers refer with: 
“So an implicit reference theory according to which speakers refer 
aphonically to mode of presentation types faces a compound problem: 
the theory has ordinary speakers referring to things they don’t know 
about with things they don’t know about” (Neale 2016: 154).
This variation of the meaning-intention problem appears to rely 
on the following assumption, which is a fairly straightforward conse-
quence of (RW):
(Syntactic Knowledge) If a speaker S refers to some entity o with 
some expression e, then S must be able to form an intention that has e 
as part of its content, and hence must “know about” e, in some sense.
I will argue that this assumption is incompatible with the data.
2. Extrinsic Parameters
There are a number of examples that appear to contradict the proposed 
principles supporting the meaning-intention problem. They seem to 
show quite clearly that a speaker S can express a proposition p that is 
about, or concerns, some entity e, even though S either lacks a concept 
of e, contra (Cognitive Resources), or simply lacks conscious awareness 
of expressing a proposition about e, contra (Awareness).
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(8)  This book weighs fi ve pounds.
(9)  The fl ash and the bang happened at the same time.
(10)  It’s summer.
Each of these sentences expresses a proposition whose truth value de-
pends on the state of some entity that is not explicitly mentioned in the 
sentence itself:
(8*)  This book weighs fi ve pounds (on Earth).
(9*)  The fl ash and the bang happened at the same time (relative to 
   Earth as a frame of reference).
(10*) It’s summer (in the Northern hemisphere).
Most educated speakers know that weight is something that can ac-
tually vary depending on what large body of mass you happen to be 
standing on. And many (though perhaps not most) speakers know that 
simultaneity is not an absolute relation, but rather that two events are 
simultaneous only with respect to a reference frame.
What’s important for our discussion is that despite the fact that 
many educated speakers are aware of such relativization, many com-
petent speakers are not. Indeed, for large periods of human history, no 
competent speaker grasped that weight is relativized or had any idea 
what a reference frame was. This did not in any way prevent them 
from communicating complete thoughts in uttering sentences like (8)–
(10). Therefore, contra (Cognitive Resources), it is not the case that if a 
speaker expresses some proposition p that contains some entity o, then 
she must have some conceptual grasp of o. A fortiori, she need not have 
conscious awareness of such a concept either, contra (Awareness).
Considering sentence (10), even if we assume that all, or almost 
all, competent speakers know that what season it is depends on what 
hemisphere you are in, it is entirely plausible that a speaker might 
utter (10) and not be thinking about hemispheres at all, i.e., not have 
any awareness of saying something that is about a hemisphere. This 
again contradicts (Awareness). Even for those cases in which speakers 
have the requisite concepts, they may not be aware of invoking those 
concepts in performing their utterance.
Neale (2016: 160ff.) raises similar examples, referring to such cases 
as involving “extrinsic parameters,” but fails to draw any substantial 
conclusions from them. Instead, he focuses on the disanalogies between 
these cases and MOPs, in order to show that whatever solace the hid-
den indexical theorist hopes to fi nd in such cases does not help the 
hidden indexical theory of belief reports. Examples (8)–(10) relate to 
factors external to us… about which we may be ignorant but about which we 
may acquire knowledge and thereby easily refi ne our linguistic behaviour. 
Mode of presentation types are not like this at all. They are supposed to 
be things under which beliefs are had, and learning about their existence 
and a great deal of information about their roles in theories of language 
and mind doesn’t even put theorists in a position to articulate the truth 
conditions of the propositions they actually express on given occasions us-
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ing belief sentences if the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports is true. 
(Neale 2016: 163)
Thus, unlike with MOPs, “once speakers learn about time-zones, hemi-
spheres and rest-frames, and learn a few additional words, they can 
easily describe the parameters relevant to the truth or falsity of what 
they are saying…”
First of all, this seems doubtful. For instance, I know that wheth-
er or not two events are simultaneous depends on a reference frame. 
However, not having much grasp of relativity theory, my knowledge of 
reference frames ends there. It is fair to say that I know far more about 
MOPs than about reference frames.
The main issue, though, is not whether MOPs are easier to grasp 
than reference frames, or vice versa. The problem is rather that ex-
amples like (8)–(10) seriously undermine the general assumptions that 
support the meaning-intention problem. It isn’t clear what comfort the 
proponent of the meaning-intention problem is supposed to fi nd in the 
fact that even though most speakers lack a proper concept of a refer-
ence frame, and many would never “dream of telling you that what he 
meant and was implicitly stating” was something to do with reference 
frames, there are others who do grasp the concept, and perhaps with 
suffi cient training the rest of the population could do so as well.
The fact is that relatively few competent speakers grasp the concept 
of a reference frame. Some might be able to recall that simultaneity is a 
relative notion, if pressed, but even this is reserved for an educated seg-
ment of the population. Nevertheless, ordinary speakers are perfectly 
competent with phrases like “at the same time.” This, again, shows 
that the principles adduced to support the meaning-intention prob-
lem cannot be sustained. There may be important differences between 
MOPs and reference frames, but these differences cannot be used to 
salvage the meaning-intention problem in its current form.
What about Neale’s syntactic analogue of the original meaning-in-
tention problem? Is there an aphonic-intention problem?
I claim, once again by reductio ad absurdum, that (Syntactic Knowl-
edge) simply cannot be supported in light of the data. Consider the fol-
lowing sentence of Spanish:
(11)  Quiere comer. [He wants to eat.]
According to standard assumptions of generative syntax (cf. Haegeman 
1994: 68–69ff.), in order to comply with the Extended Projection Prin-
ciple, it is argued that (11) must contain a phonologically null subject, 
which is typically expressed as pro:
(12)  pro quiere comer.
Pro (distinct from PRO) is a phonologically null pronoun, which is the 
subject of the main clause, and whose semantic value is determined 
by the speaker’s intentions. Importantly, although its existence is not 
supported by every syntactician, pro is an established posit in syntax 
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with independent syntactic support—in other words, it is not some-
thing that is just posited by philosophers in order to generate their 
desired truth conditions.
Precisely the same concerns that Neale raises for aphonic indexicals 
in ‘Silent Reference’ would have to apply to pro (which is, effectively, 
an aphonic indexical). Most speakers lack any conceptual grasp of the 
expression pro, and the speaker of (11) might positively deny that she 
used a tacit referring expression at all. Therefore, if Neale’s arguments 
are sound, we fi nd that we must reject some basic posits of mainstream 
syntactic theory as well.
Regardless of whether pro exists or not, is doubtful that Neale would 
be sanguine about this consequence. He often takes philosophers to 
task for their tendency to make non-trivial claims about syntax purely 
on the basis of philosophical considerations. But that is precisely what 
we would have to do if we accept (Syntactic Knowledge).
On refl ection, we can see that (Syntactic Knowledge) is a rather 
demanding principle. It effectively implies that linguistic ability and 
metalinguistic knowledge must proceed “in tandem”—I cannot use an 
expression to refer unless I have conceptual grasp of that expression. 
Even for overt expressions, however, it is not obvious that we should 
accept such a principle.
The problem for the Gricean is that (Syntactic Knowledge) is a fair-
ly direct consequence of (RW). But it appears that (Syntactic Knowl-
edge) must be rejected. Therefore, it seems that (RW) must be rejected 
as well.
3. Tacit States
One direct consequence of the preceding discussion is that (Awareness) 
should be abandoned. This is all for the good, for the picture of meaning 
that it presupposes is a strongly Cartesian one. Why should we assume 
that speakers do have privileged access to every aspect of the contents 
of their speech acts? This is certainly not required in order for them to 
have meaning-intentions, assuming that such intentions may fail to be 
fully conscious. And why shouldn’t this be the case? Certainly, some 
strong arguments would be needed to establish that intentions must be 
conscious; or, at least, that meaning-intentions are special in that they 
must be conscious. But the Gricean ought to be very cautious about the 
latter claim, for her entire program is based around positing a certain 
kind of complex intention as the basis for communication, where this 
intention does not simply reveal itself through introspection.
The question, then, is whether (RW) can be salvaged by interpreting 
the intentional verbs intend and recognize in terms of tacit states—
tacit intentions and tacit recognition.
First, it is worth noting that (RW), as it stands, is inadequate—it 
fails to provide either necessary or suffi cient conditions for referring-
with:
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(i) Consider the following sentence:
(13) I saw Alicei and then shei disappeared.
Here I have referred to Alice, and there are two expressions with which 
I referred to Alice. The problem is only the fi rst instance can satisfy 
(RW). Recall (RW):
(RW) In uttering x, S referred to o with (or using) e, relative to its i-th 
occurrence in x, iff for some audience A and relation R, S intended A to 
recognize that R(e, x, i, o) and, at least partly on the basis of this, that 
S referred to o in uttering x.
(RW) requires that if a speaker S uses e to refer to o, then S must in-
tend her audience A to recognize that S referred to o in uttering the 
sentence x, and to do so at least partly on the basis of her utterance 
of e. But the problem is that A will recognize that S referred to Alice 
simply on the basis of the utterance of ‘Alice.’ Since “referring to Alice” 
really means “expressing an Alice-dependent proposition,” then A will 
know that S referred to Alice as soon as ‘Alice’ is uttered (and S will 
know this). Therefore, A will recognize (and S will know that A will 
recognize) that S referred to Alice purely on the basis of the fi rst refer-
ence to Alice—and if this provides a suffi cient reason for A to believe 
that S referred to Alice (as indeed it does), then S cannot intend for A to 
recognize this even partly on the basis of the second reference to Alice 
(‘she’). But, intuitively, S referred to Alice with ‘she.’ Therefore, (RW) 
does not provide a necessary condition for referring-with.
To resolve this problem, (RW) must therefore be modifi ed along the 
following lines:
(RW*) In uttering x, S referred to o with (or using) e, relative to its i-th 
occurrence in x, iff for some audience A and relation R, S intended A to 
recognize that R(e, x, i, o) and to recognize that R(e, x, i, o) provides a 
reason to believe that S referred to o in uttering x.
This modifi cation avoids the preceding worry because it does not re-
quire that S intend that A’s belief that S referred to o be derived on 
the basis of A’s recognition that R(e, x, i, o), but simply that such rec-
ognition provide the hearer with a basis for arriving at such a belief 
(whether or not it is the basis that is in fact used). However, (RW*) 
does not require S to even be referring to o (or even to intend for A to 
recognize that she is referring to o)—it only makes the weaker require-
ment that S intend for A to recognize that S is doing something that 
provides a reason to believe that S referred to o. This seems too weak. 
Thus, perhaps the following will suffi ce:
(RW**) In uttering x, S referred to o with (or using) e, relative to its i-th 
occurrence in x, iff for some audience A and relation R, S intended A to 
recognize that R(e, x, i, o) and to recognize that R(e, x, i, o) provides a 
reason to believe that S referred to o in uttering x, and to recognize that 
S referred to o in uttering x.
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(ii) The second problem with (RW) is that it does not only apply to re-
ferring expressions. Consider, e.g., a classroom in which there are two 
teachers, Alice and Bob, and a number of young students, one of whom 
is named Bob. Alice is talking to Student Bob’s parents and says:
(14) Bob will be teaching the class today,
meaning thereby that Teacher Bob would be teaching the class. In ut-
tering (14), Alice relies on the conventional meaning of Bob as a name 
for Bob, and thus, following (RW), refers to Bob with Bob insofar as she 
expects her audience to recognize that she is referring to Bob by utter-
ing Bob. However, she can’t expect that uttering Bob is suffi cient for 
her audience to recognize that she is referring to Teacher Bob, and not 
Student Bob. Rather, it is the context of the sentence as a whole—or, in 
particular, the verb ‘teaching’—that makes it clear which Bob Alice is 
referring to. Thus, the right-hand side of (RW) appears to be satisfi ed 
by the utterance of ‘teaching’ as well. (RW) says that a speaker S refers 
to o with some expression e just in case for some audience A and rela-
tion R, S intended A to recognize that R(e, x, i, o) and, at least partly 
on the basis of this, that S referred to o in uttering x. Instantiating the 
variables: Alice intended her audience to recognize that ‘teaching’ bears 
some relation to Teacher Bob and, at least partly on the basis of this, 
that S referred to Teacher Bob in uttering x. Thus, (RW) implies that 
Alice referred to Teacher Bob with the word ‘teaching.’ Since, intuitive-
ly, Alice did not refer to Bob with the word ‘teaching,’ this implies that 
(RW) does not provide a suffi cient condition for referring-with either.
Unfortunately, no obvious solution to this problem presents itself. 
The simplicity of (RW) lies in the fact that it analyzes referring-with 
in terms of offering reasons to believe that one is expressing an o-de-
pendent proposition. But, prima facie, there is no reason why this con-
dition should be satisfi able by referring expressions only, since other 
information in the sentence might be intended to help convey what the 
speaker is referring to, as well.
These problems of defi nition notwithstanding, the question remains 
whether (RW) (or (RW**)) is acceptable if one reads the intentional 
verbs in terms of tacit states.
Two issues must be separated. In discussing tacit states, Neale sug-
gests that ‘tacit’ amounts to ‘unconscious,’ glossing “The Tacit States 
Reply” as assuming that “S is not ‘consciously aware’ that she means 
a proposition of the form…” (Neale 2016: 163). This appears to be the 
sense of ‘tacit’ used by Brian Loar (1976) as well. However, Neale also 
describes the view as assuming “tacit knowledge” in Chomsky’s concep-
tion of the term. Chomskyan tacit knowledge is not merely unconscious, 
but is also functionally isolated—grammatical knowledge is not inte-
grated into the web of belief, i.e., it is not accessible to central reasoning 
processes. One might assume that these two categories bear some logi-
cal relation to each other—for instance, that anything that is in the web 
of belief is accessible to consciousness—but this is by no means obvious.
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Which of these senses is more appropriate for (RW)? (RW) must 
grant that speakers tacitly know, e.g., that the Spanish sentence Qui-
ere comer has an unpronounced nominal expression in subject position. 
But it is doubtful that all competent Spanish speakers have a concept 
(even an unconscious one) of the expression pro. Rather, this “knowl-
edge” is more akin to the kind of syntactic knowledge that comprises 
the language faculty—not fully conceptual, and not integrated into 
central reasoning. Therefore, the defender of (RW) must grant that 
the tacit knowledge mentioned in the defi nition is tacit in the strong, 
Chomskyan sense.
However, introducing tacit intentions in this manner presents a 
radical break from traditional Gricean thinking. For one of the appar-
ent advantages of Grice’s theory is that it accounts for the ways in 
which linguistic production interacts with global reasoning abilities. 
Speakers intentionally produce effects in the audience that are respon-
sive to background knowledge, features of the context, and other fac-
tors that interact with central reasoning. By claiming that referential 
intentions can be tacit in the Chomskyan sense (functionally isolated), 
the defender of (RW-T) weakens the connection between speaker’s 
meaning and rationality. If one pursues this approach to the end, one 
may fi nd that the result is no longer distinctly Gricean.
4. Specifi city
I have argued that examples like,
(9) The fl ash and the bang happened at the same time,
show convincingly that the principles underlying the various aspects of 
“the meaning-intention problem,” in particular (Awareness) and (Cog-
nitive Resources) are not tenable.
If we reject (Cognitive Resources), then we must reject (Specifi city) 
as well. The problem raised by (Specifi city) is that it seems like there 
ought to be something about the speaker’s state of mind, or commu-
nicative intentions, that determines which of a number of competing 
alternatives is the actual semantic value of a hidden indexical. But if 
speakers can refer to o (express an o-dependent proposition) without 
even having a concept of o, as I claim is demonstrated by sentences like 
(9), then it cannot be the speaker’s specifying intentions that resolve 
the (Specifi city) problem.
However, it is worth noting that (Specifi city) is not essentially a 
problem about language or communication, but rather is a puzzle about 
thought contents. For example, consider:
(15) The book is covered with paint.
Suppose a speaker utters (15) to communicate that the addressee’s fa-
vorite book, War and Peace, which was left sitting on the dining room 
table, is covered with paint. The problem relating to (Specifi city) is that 
the book does not serve to uniquely pick out the aforementioned book, 
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and there does not seem to be any unique candidate for completing the 
nominal that is the one that the speaker intended to communicate. 
This is what is known as an incomplete description.
This presents a puzzle about the speaker’s thoughts about the book, 
as well. In particular, what is the conceptual content of the speaker’s 
thought, the book is covered with paint? One might assume that when 
a speaker tokens such a thought, there is some description or other 
(over and above the book) under which she thinks of the book. But why 
would she token one description or the other on any given occasion? 
Is doing so necessary in order for her to entertain thoughts about the 
book? But surely she needn’t token a uniquely identifying description 
of the book, for coming up with such a description is no simple task. 
But then it begins to look as though the descriptive information is not 
doing any cognitive work, and the thought is already complete as it is. 
But if that’s the case, then why should an utterance like (15) not be 
complete as it is?
In sum, I am arguing that (a) examples like (9) show that (Specifi c-
ity) must be rejected if (Cognitive Resources) is rejected, as I claim it 
must be; and, (b) the issue of incomplete defi nite descriptions is primar-
ily an issue regarding mental contents, and only derivatively an issue 
pertaining to communication. Furthermore, brief consideration of the 
matter suggests that incomplete defi nite descriptions may very well 
exist in thought as well, which implies that the assumptions behind 
(Specifi city) are misguided.
5. Constraints on Semantic Theories
If these arguments are correct, then the meaning-intention problem 
is based on implausible assumptions, and cannot be used as a way to 
refute the hidden indexical theory of belief attribution, or other hid-
den indexical theories. Speakers can express a proposition that is o-
dependent even if they entirely lack the concept of o. However, there 
are signifi cant differences between the Extrinsic Parameters Reply as 
applied to reference frames and as applied to MOPs and other more 
speculative philosophical entities.
According to Hofweber (1999), the relevant difference is that when 
it comes to reference frames (with respect to simultaneity) or bodies of 
mass (with respect to weight), the extrinsic parameter, or unarticulated 
constituent, is constant for all members of the speech community. Thus 
while people failed to realize that weight is a relativized notion, there 
could never be any confusion or disagreement amongst the members 
of the community regarding which planet was relevant to their weight 
statements. This allowed discourse about weight to carry on unprob-
lematically, without the body of mass being specifi ed by the speakers’ 
intentions. This is because the relativization did not affect “sameness 
and difference (or incompatibility) of contents” amongst speakers.
The same facts do not apply to MOPs. MOPs are not shared amongst 
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all members of the community, and there is the tendency for confusion 
when making belief reports.
Hofweber concludes that the problem with the hidden indexical the-
ory of belief reports is that it implies “not only… that speakers have no 
access (in the strong sense spelled out above) to the content of their ut-
terances, but also no access to sameness, difference and incompatibility 
of the contents of their utterances” (Hofweber 1999: 102). However, he 
leaves it open why this fact is problematic.
I suspect that the problem is ill-formulated as once again pertaining 
to access. The reason why speakers must “share the referent” when it 
comes to genuinely unarticulated constituents (extrinsic parameters) 
is that testimony would break down otherwise. For two speakers might 
use the same sentence to express thoughts that concern distinct enti-
ties without their being aware of any difference. Thus, if one speaker 
asserts that sentence to another, the addressee might form a belief 
that has entirely different truth conditions. Over time, this discrepancy 
might cause problems and lead to the extinction of the use of the term.
Alternatively, through the course of such discrepancies, speakers 
may learn to identify in what ways the truth conditions of each speak-
er’s use diverge from each other, and thus may gain a conceptual un-
derstanding of the way that the sentence is relativitized. This might 
be an important step in coming to grasp the true nature of the relation 
being discussed.
In sum, defenders of hidden indexical theories for belief attribu-
tions and knowledge claims cannot appeal to extrinsic parameters to 
supply the referents in such utterances, since the alleged referents are 
not constant amongst members of the community, or across contexts. 
The only alternative is to argue that speakers really do grasp concepts 
such as MOPs and their communicative intentions do serve to pick out 
properties of such MOPs in the required way. This would be to abandon 
the Extrinsic Parameters approach, but this leads back to the same 
problems initially raised by Schiffer and Neale.
6. Conclusion
The meaning-intention problem has been used by theorists in the 
Gricean tradition to reject certain semantic hypotheses involving hid-
den indexical expressions. Hidden indexical theories imply that speak-
ers lack full awareness of their own speech and thought contents, and 
in some cases lack the relevant concepts entirely. This appears incom-
patible with the Gricean approach to language, according to which 
speech act content depends on the speaker’s communicative intentions. 
I have attempted to reverse this dialectic by showing that the assump-
tions that support the meaning-intention problem are incompatible 
with some basic data. Since these assumptions are natural ones for 
the Gricean to make, I have attempted to explore how this affects the 
project of intention-based semantics. I have argued that the defi nition 
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of referring-with that is offered by Schiffer and Neale needs to be re-
considered. It fails to provide either necessary or suffi cient conditions 
for referring with an expression, and it is incompatible with facts about 
pro-drop languages, such as Spanish.
The meaning-intention problem, as traditionally conceived, thus 
appears to have little force. Nonetheless, I agree with Hofweber that 
appeals to extrinsic parameters must be tightly constrained. The clear 
cases of extrinsic parameters, or unarticulated constituents, that I 
have appealed to (such as weight and simultaneity) involve parame-
ters that are constant amongst the members of the speech community. 
MOPs and standards of knowledge do not share this feature, and thus 
the same considerations do not apply.
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